Good Faith Settlements: The Inequitable Result of the Evolving Definition of  Equity by Todd, Christopher W.
California Western Law Review 
Volume 22 Number 2 Article 7 
1986 
Good Faith Settlements: The Inequitable Result of the Evolving 
Definition of "Equity" 
Christopher W. Todd 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr 
Recommended Citation 
Todd, Christopher W. (1986) "Good Faith Settlements: The Inequitable Result of the Evolving Definition of 
"Equity"," California Western Law Review: Vol. 22 : No. 2 , Article 7. 
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol22/iss2/7 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by CWSL Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in California Western Law Review by an authorized editor of CWSL Scholarly Commons. For more 
information, please contact alm@cwsl.edu. 
Good Faith Settlements: The Inequitable Result of
the Evolving Definition of "Equity"
INTRODUCTION
The current year is 1986, but from the look of things in California
tort law, it might as well be 1956. The bold yet logical steps taken
by California's lawmakers and judges during the last thirty years to
ensure that no defendant bears more than his fair share of an in-
jured plaintiff's damages have apparently been for naught.' The
recent decision of Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates2
attempts to alleviate the unfair results that have occurred, yet, as
will be discussed, Tech-Bilt may serve only to compound the
problem.
Thirty years ago, California was in a quandary over the inequity
and unfairness of one part of its tort compensation system. In a
lawsuit involving several defendants claimed to be responsible for
the same injury, 3 the system allowed a plaintiff to choose the un-
lucky defendant who would be required to satisfy his judgment.
The defendant forced to pay was not given the right to receive any
contributions from his co-wrongdoers by the law.4 Sweeping
changes occurred in the next twenty-five years, beginning with the
enactment of California Code of Civil Procedure sections 875-80
[hereinafter referred to as the Contribution Statutes]. 5 The changes
were designed to distribute more equitably the responsibility for a
plaintiff's losses, and ultimately evolved into our current system of
apportioning liability in direct relation to each party's proportionate
fault.
Yet today, even after the Tech-Bilt decision, and perhaps because
1. The steps taken include the enactment of CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 875-80
(West 1980) [hereinafter cited as the Contribution Statutes], in 1957 (discussed infra at
notes 19-32 and accompanying text); the adoption of comparative negligence in Li v.
Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975) (discussed
infra at notes 34-37 and accompanying text); and the adoption of partial and compara-
tive indemnity in American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578
P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978) (discussed infra at notes 38-49 and accompanying
text).
2. 38 Cal. 3d 488, 698 P.2d 159, 213 Cal. Rptr. 256 (1985).
3. These defendants are commonly known as "joint tortfeasors." The term "joint
tortfeasors" applies to those who act in concert to accomplish a common purpose and
whose concerted acts cause the harm. 4 B. WrrIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW
§ 30, at 2329 (1974).
4. No right of contribution existed at common law. See infra note 14 and accom-
panying text.
5. Contribution Statutes, supra note 1.
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the California Supreme Court acted too quickly in adopting a joint
tort system based on comparative negligence, a plaintiff can choose
among joint tortfeasors and decide which one will be entitled to the
benefit of a "good faith settlement" with him.6 Once the settling
defendant has received his dismissal from the plaintiff, the remain-
ing defendants are not able to determine the proportionate share of
their ex-codefendant's fault. 7 With the settling defendant thus ab-
sent, the plaintiff may then pursue his claim against the remaining
defendants who, under the doctrine of joint and several liability,
must satisfy the plaintiff's entire judgment when found liable-even
if only one percent liable-for the plaintiff's damages.8 Thus, the
inequitable results which were so much a part of our earlier tort
law-and for which the majority of the bar at that time expressed
great distaste-are still with us.
Certainly, the policy considerations of equitable apportionment
of fault, expressed clearly in the landmark California decisions of Li
v. Yellow Cab Co.9 and American Motorcycle Association v. Superior
Court 10 were not stated by California's supreme court justices just
to be ignored. How then could the tort system evolving after those
decisions require a defendant, only one percent at fault, to bear the
burden of plaintiff's judgment in its entirety?
The primary answer which this Comment will examine lies in the
Li and American Motorcycle decisions themselves; for in adopting
by judicial decision the doctrine of comparative negligence and
comparative partial indemnity, the supreme court may not have re-
alized the potential for unfairness these doctrines might have when
applied in California's already existing statutory contribution sys-
6. Clearly, the decision to adopt comparative negligence and do away with the all-
or-nothing contributory negligence rule was a logical and needed change in California.
See discussion of Li, infra notes 34-37 and accompanying text. However, it does not
seem as though the court was able to reflect on the ramifications of applying Li to a
joint tortfeasor situation with enough lucidity in the three short years that elapsed
before American Motorcycle was decided. See discussion of American Motorcycle, infra
notes 38-49 and accompanying text. A "good faith settlement" is a settlement reached
under CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 877 & 877.6, which shields the settling defendant
from liability for claims of contribution, comparative contribution, and comparative
partial indemnity. See discussion of the Contribution Statutes, infra notes 19-32 and
accompanying text.
7. The determination cannot be made because the settlor is no longer a party to
the lawsuit. See infra notes 19-32 and accompanying text.
8. See discussion of common law, infra notes 13-18 and accompanying text. The
doctrine of joint and several liability has seen much criticism recently, since it enables a
plaintiff to sue defendants with deep pockets (such as municipalities or parties who are
well-insured) and recover large amounts from them, although their share of the fault
may be minimal.
9. 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858.
10. 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182.
1986]
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tem."' The resulting inconsistency seen in "good faith settlement"
cases decided after Li and American Motorcycle exemplifies the in-
compatibility of the policy of those decisions with the policy of the
Contribution Statutes, and highlights the changing definition of
"equity" in the joint tort context. 12
This Comment will discuss the developments in California joint
tortfeasor law over the past thirty years, will explore the effect that
the commingled developments have had on joint tortfeasors, and
will specifically focus on the problems associated with "good faith
settlements." This Comment will then encourage statutory reform
of the current joint tortfeasor system, including repeal of the Con-
tribution Statutes and enactment of a new code section which will
be more in line with the Li and American Motorcycle policy
objectives.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF CALIFORNIA JOINT TORTFEASOR LAW
A. Common Law
At common law and today, each tortfeasor whose act combines
indivisibly with another's to harm a plaintiff is jointly and severally
liable for the plaintiff's damages.' 3 If the plaintiff is awarded a
judgment against two joint tortfeasors, he can collect the entire
judgment from either of the two. The rationale behind this rule is
that an injured plaintiff should not bear the risk of having been in-
jured by a judgment-proof defendant. If the plaintiff cannot recover
the damages to which he is entitled from one defendant, the other
defendant, also at fault, must pick up the slack. Of critical impor-
tance in the development of the joint and several liability rule, was
that all defendants be equally at fault.
Also at common law, no right of contribution existed between
two joint tortfeasors.14 If one defendant satisfied a plaintiff's judg-
ment in its entirety, he could not recover from his codefendant any
of the amount he paid to the plaintiff. The policy reason of this rule
was that the law should not aid a tortfeasor. The same policy sup-
ported the rule that a plaintiff who was contributorily negligent was
11. See discussion of Li and American Motorcycle infra, notes 34-49 and accompa-
nying text.
12. See discussion of problems in settlement law infra, notes 65-88 and accompany-
ing text.
13. The imposition of joint and several liability allows a plaintiff to enforce judg-
ment against any of a number of multiple tortfeasors whose negligent acts were the
proximate cause of plaintiff's indivisible injury. See W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEE-
TON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 47, at 328 (5th ed. 1984). See also 4 B. WITKIN, SUM-
MARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW § 37, at 2335 (1974).
14. Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Assoc., 38 Cal. 3d 488, 493, 698 P.2d
159, 162, 213 Cal. Rptr. 256, 259 (1985). See also River Garden Farms, Inc. v. Superior
Court, 26 Cal. App. 3d 986, 103 Cal. Rptr. 498 (1972).
[Vol. 22
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completely barred from recovering damages from those he had
sued. 15
Finally, the release of one defendant from a case meant the re-
lease of all defendants under joint tortfeasor law. 16 The policy of
this overly technical rule apparently was that if one of two joint
tortfeasors was not thought by the plaintiff to be at fault for his
damages, how could the other defendant still be responsible when
the act causing the injury was indivisible. 17
These strict common law rules worked highly inequitable re-
sults.' 8 Defendants subject to the joint and several liability and no
contribution rules were sometimes required to pay more from their
own pockets than that for which they were directly responsible.
Plaintiffs and defendants alike could not benefit from the time and
money saving advantages of pretrial settlement, due to the inability
of a plaintiff to make an independent settlement with one of his
alleged tortfeasors without releasing them all. In response to com-
plaints about the unfairness of the common law rules, the legislature
enacted the Contribution Statutes in 1957.19
15. Li, 13 Cal. 3d at 810, 532 P.2d at 1230, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 862.
16. Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal. 3d at 493, 698 P.2d at 163, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 259. See also
W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 47, at 301 (4th ed. 1971).
17. W. PROSSER, supra note 16, § 47, at 301.
18. Several doctrines arose to ease the rigidity of the common law rules. For exam-
ple, since no right of contribution existed, the doctrine of equitable indemnity arose to
allow a "passively negligent" joint torfeasor to shift the entire liability to his "actively
negligent" co-tortfeasor. American Motorcycle, 20 Cal. 3d at 583, 578 P.2d at 902, 146
Cal. Rptr. at 184. The doctrine of last clear chance developed to soften the harshness of
the contributory negligence rule. See W. PROSSER, supra note 16, § 66, at 427-33. Cov-
enants not to sue and covenants not to enforce judgment were devised to mitigate the
harshness of the "release of one releases all" rule. See C.R. HEFT & C.J. HEFT, COM-
PARATIVE NEGLIGENCE MANUAL § 4.230, at 13 (rev. ed. 1978).
19. The Contribution Statutes, supra note 1, as originally enacted in 1957,
provided:
(a) where a money judgment has been rendered jointly against two or more
defendants in a tort action there shall be a right of contribution among them
as hereinafter provided.
(b) Such right of contribution shall be administered in accordance with the
principles of equity.
(c) Such right of contribution may be enforced only after one tortfeasor has,
by payment, discharged the joint judgment or has paid more than his pro rata
share thereof. It shall be limited to the excess so paid over the pro rata share
of the person so paying and in no event shall any tortfeasor be compelled to
make contribution beyond his own pro rata share of the entire judgment.
(d) There shall be no right of contribution in favor of any tortfeasor who has
intentionally injured the injured person.
(e) A liability insurer who by payment has discharged the liability of a
tortfeasor judgment debtor shall be subrogated to his right of contribution.
(f) This title shall not impair any right of indemnity under existing law, and
where one tortfeasor judgment debtor is entitled to indemnity from another,
there shall be no right of contribution between them.
(g) This title shall not impair the right of a plaintiff to satisfy a judgment in
full as against any tortfeasor judgment debtor.
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B. The Contribution Statutes
The primary goal of the Contribution Statutes was to statutorily
affirm the existence of the right of a defendant to contribution.20
These California Code of Civil Procedure sections provide that once
a money judgment has been rendered against two or more defend-
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 875 (West 1980).
(a) The pro rata share of each tortfeasor judgment debtor shall be deter-
mined by dividing the entire judgment equally among all of them.
(b) Where one or more persons are held liable solely for the tort of one of
them or of another, as in the case of the liability of a master for the tort of his
servant, they shall contribute a single pro rata share, as to which there may be
indemnity between them.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 876 (West 1980).
Where a release, dismissal with or without prejudice, or a covenant not to sue
or not to enforce judgment is given in good faith before verdict or judgment to
one or more of a number of tortfeasors claimed to be liable for the same tort-(a) It shall not discharge any other such tortfeasor from liability unless its
terms so provide, but it shall reduce the claims against the others in the
amount stipulated by the release, the dismissal or the covenant, or in the
amount of the consideration paid for it, whichever is the greater; and
(b) It shall discharge the tortfeasor to whom it is given from all liability for
any contribution to any other tortfeasors.
CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 877 (West 1980).
Judgment for contribution may be entered by one tortfeasor judgment debtor
against other tortfeasor judgment debtors by motion upon notice. Notice of
such motion shall be given to all parties in the action, including the plaintiff or
plaintiffs, at least ten days before the hearing thereon. Such notice shall be
accompanied by an affidavit setting forth any information which the moving
party may have as to the assets of defendants available for satisfaction of thejudgment or claim for contribution.
CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 878 (West 1980).
If any provision of this title or the application thereof to any person is held
invalid, such invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications of the
title which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application and
to this end the provisions of this title are declared to be severable.
CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 879 (West 1980).
This title shall become effective as to causes of action accruing on or after
January 1, 1958.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 880 (West 1980).
20. A full, although somewhat inaccurate, discussion of the adoption of the Contri-
bution Statutes, supra note 1, is given in Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal. 3d 488, 698 P.2d 159, 213
Cal. Rptr. 256, as well as in River Garden, 26 Cal. App. 3d at 993-96, 103 Cal. Rptr. at
503-05. The Tech-Bilt and River Garden courts noted that the Contribution Statutes
were quite similar to the 1955 revision of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors
Act, and quite likely were modeled on that act. However, a close reading of the com-
ments to the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act shows that the courts may
have miscontrued the significance of the requirement of "good faith" under the Contri-
bution Statutes. The commissioners who drafted the Uniform Contribution Among
Tortfeasors Act were concerned only with limiting collusion between a settling plaintiff
and defendant. Also, the California Legislature, at the time it adopted the Contribution
Statutes, had no way of foreseeing the expansion of the multiple tortfeasor system which
came with Li and American Motorcycle. Tech-Bilt and River Garden go well beyond
those limited purposes, deciding that the "good faith" requirement mandates that a
settlement be within a reasonable range of the defendant's fair share of fault. See Tech-
Bilt, 38 Cal. 3d at 502-05, 698 P.2d at 169-71, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 266-68 (Bird, CJ.,
dissenting).
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ants for a joint tort, the right of contribution exists.21 The right
may be enforced only after one defendant has completely dis-
charged, or at least paid, more than his fair share of the judgment.22
The amount of contribution available from any codefendant is lim-
ited to the excess one has paid over his pro rata share. 23 The pro
rata share of each defendant is determined by dividing the judgment
in equal parts between each.24
Though no tortfeasor is required under the Contribution Statutes
to make contribution beyond his own pro rata share, the joint and
several liability rule still applies to protect the plaintiff from the
danger of not getting complete recovery. 25 Thus, one of the joint
tortfeasors can still be required to satisfy the entire judgment if his
codefendant is insolvent or judgment proof.
A second goal of the Contribution Statutes was to encourage at
least partial settlement of cases before trial.26 To encourage a plain-
tiff to settle, section 877 provides that a release, dismissal, covenant
not to sue, or covenant not to enforce judgment, given in "good
faith" to one defendant, will not discharge any other defendant
from the lawsuit.27 The plaintiff can make a partial settlement with
the confidence of being able to be completely compensated for his
damages, because his claims against the remaining defendants are
reduced only in the amount stipulated by the release or actually
paid by the settling defendant.28 The defendant is encouraged to
settle because the "good faith settlement" discharges him from any
potential liability for contribution to his codefendants. 29 Thus, once
the defendant settles, he can close his books on the case.
It is clear that the Contribution Statutes do not encourage equita-
ble apportionment of fault, nor were they so intended. 30 The pri-
mary reason for their enactment was to mitigate the harsh common
law rules present beforehand. The statutes allow the burden of a
judgment rendered against joint tortfeasors to be shared equally
among all parties responsible, rather than allow a plaintiff to hand
pick the unfortunate soul against whom to proceed.
Secondarily, the statutes encourage pre-trial disposition of law-
suits where no encouragement, in fact, only punishment for doing
so, was present beforehand. The danger of contravening the pri-
21. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 875(a) (West 1980).
22. CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 875(c) (West 1980).
23. Id.
24. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 876(a) (West 1980).
25. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 875(c) & 875(g) (West 1980).
26. See supra note 20.
27. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877(a) (West 1980).
28. This is known as a pro tanto reduction. Id.
29. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877(b).
30. C.R. HEFT & C.J. HEFr, supra note 18, § 4A.50 at 5, 8.
1986]
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mary goal of the statutes is lessened by requiring a settlement to be
made in good faith; in other words, without collusion between a
settling plaintiff and defendant.31 The good faith requirement is
thus designed to limit the opportunity for an unscrupulous plaintiff
to hand pick the best defendant to proceed against-the one whose
deep pockets will satisfy his judgment or whose evil disposition will
ensure a sympathetic judgment at trial-by dismissing the other de-
fendants from the case.3 2
The Contribution Statutes provided a greatly needed-albeit tem-
porary-solution to a tort compensation system that was governed
by strict, inequitable common law rules. They provided a system
where responsibility for damages could be borne in even shares by
those at fault. In essence, the statutes provided the following defini-
tion of "equity": When there is more than one tortfeasor allegedly
liable for a plaintiff's injuries, "equity" means that those tortfeasors
should make equal contributions to the plaintiff's recovery.33
The Contribution Statutes also opened the door for the continued
advancement of our fault-sharing system, which came with the
landmark decisions of Li and American Motorcycle. However, with
those two decisions behind us, it is clear that the Contribution Stat-
utes no longer have a logical place in our tort recovery system. In
fact, since the Li and American Motorcycle decisions, the Contribu-
tion Statutes have hindered, rather than advanced, the evolving
concept of "equity." For today, "equity" has an entirely different
meaning within the joint tort context than it did thirty years ago.
C. Adoption of Comparative Fault System
Li v. Yellow Cab Co. was a simple two party lawsuit that did
away with the harsh, all-or-nothing common law rule preventing a
plaintiff from recovering any damages that were caused in part, no
matter how small, by himself 34 In its place, the California Supreme
Court adopted the doctrine of pure comparative negligence.35
31. See supra note 20.
32. See generally UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT § 4 com-
missioners' comment (1955), 12 U.L.A. 98-100 (1975).
33. Contribution Statutes, supra note 1.
34. Li, 13 Cal. 3d at 828-29, 532 P.2d at 1243, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 875.
35. Id. Comparative negligence generally can be one of three types. Pure compar-
ative negligence allows a plaintiff to recover, even if its negligence is greater than the
negligence of the adverse tortfeasor. The plaintiff's recovery is diminished by his de-
gree of contributory negligence. C.R. HEFT & C.J. HEFT, supra note 18, § 1.50 at 13.
Modified comparative negligence allows a plaintiff to recover if his negligence is less
than one-half of the total. He is barred from recovery if his share of fault is 50 percent
or more. As in pure comparative negligence, the plaintiff's recovery is diminished by
his degree of contributory negligence. Id., § 1.40 at 8-9. The third type of comparative
negligence, known as slight-gross, allows a plaintiff to recover if the defendant's negli-
gence is gross and his own negligence slight. His damages will be reduced in accordance
[Vol. 22
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Under this system, a plaintiff's contributory negligence does not
bar him from recovery; rather, any damages awarded are to be di-
minished in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to
him.
In reaching its decision in Li, the court recognized the possibility
of problems in "the administration of a rule of comparative negli-
gence in cases involving multiple parties,"' 36 including problems of
contribution and indemnity. 37 These problems were addressed
three years later in the American Motorcycle decision.
American Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court picked up
where Li left off and expanded the comparative negligence doctrine
to lawsuits involving multiple parties.38 The court held "that the
California common law equitable indemnity doctrine should be
modified to permit a concurrent tortfeasor to obtain partial indem-
nity from other concurrent tortfeasors on a comparative fault
basis." 39
Prior to American Motorcycle, the doctrine of equitable indem-
nity could be applied in multiple tortfeasor lawsuits where one de-
fendant, who was secondarily or passively negligent, was able to
pass his entire liability off to another defendant who was primarily
or actively negligent. 4° The greater culpability of the latter com-
pelled the equitable rule requiring him to satisfy plaintiff's claim.41
American Motorcycle expanded the indemnity doctrine in order to
alleviate its all-or-nothing effect, 42 just as Li abrogated the all-or-
nothing effect of the contributory negligence rule. Under the new
doctrine of comparative partial indemnity, a negligent defendant,
even if only secondarily or passively negligent, is required to answer
for his proportionate fault.43 As long as his acts or omissions com-
with the negligence attributable to him. However, if plaintiff's negligence is more than
slight, he is barred from recovery. Id., § 1.30 at 7.
36. Li, 13 Cal. 3d at 823, 532 P.2d at 1239-40, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 871-72.
37. Id.
38. American Motorcycle, 12 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182.
39. Id. at 591, 578 P.2d at 907, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 190. Within the "good faith
settlement" context, the right to obtain comparative contribution, as well as compara-
tive partial indemnity, has been recognized. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.6(c)
(West Supp. 1986). The difference between the two would be that in order to recover
comparative contribution, it would be necessary to have satisfied plaintiff's judgment in
full before bringing the claim, while comparative partial indemnity would shift the pro-
portionate fault of the defendant before judgment.
40. American Motorcycle, 20 Cal. 3d at 583, 578 P.2d at 902, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 185.
In the "good faith settlement" context there is even now a conflict raging over whether
a "good faith settlement" bars claims for full indemnity not brought under comparative
negligence principles. See Standard Pacific v. A.A. Baxter Corp., 86 L.A. DAILY J.
D.A.R. 241, 242 (4th App. Dist. Jan. 13, 1986), and cases cited therein. See also supra
note 18 and accompanying text.
41. American Motorcycle, 20 Cal. 3d at 583, 578 P.2d at 902, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 185.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 591-98, 578 P.2d at 907-12, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 190-95.
1986]
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bine with another's to cause injury to a plaintiff, then he cannot
shift the entire liability to his co-wrongdoer.44
The practical effect of American Motorcycle is to render the Con-
tribution Statutes ineffectual, since the dividing of shares in a con-
tribution system is done equally, with no consideration of relative
degrees of fault.45 What would compel a joint tortfeasor to pay off
a full judgment debt, then seek pro rata contribution from his joint
judgment debtors? Of course, no tortfeasor in his right mind would
do this after American Motorcycle, when he can file a cross-com-
plaint against his codefendant and at trial determine the actual re-
sponsibility of each party.46 Each party will then pay only its
proportionate share of plaintiff's judgment.
Yet strangely, one entire section of the American Motorcycle ma-
jority opinion is used to show how the Contribution Statutes not
only can coexist in the new comparative fault system, but that the
statutes virtually compelled the adoption of the new doctrine.4'
The court stated, "[T]he equitable nature of the comparative indem-
nity doctrine does not thwart, but enhances, the basic objective of
the contribution statute, furthering an equitable distribution of loss
among multiple tortfeasors."48
Most would agree that comparative indemnity does enhance eq-
uitable distribution of loss. 49 But the plain fact is that contribution
and comparative indemnity are not the same thing. "Equity" in the
contribution system means the equal sharing of plaintiff's damages,
regardless of degree of fault. But under a comparative fault system,
"equity" is given an entirely different meaning: the sharing of dam-
ages in proportion to actual fault.
California can choose to recognize a joint tortfeasor's right to
contribution. On the other hand, it can adopt a system which ap-
44. Id.
45. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text. See also C.R. HEFT & C.J.
HEFt, supra note 18, § 4A.90 at 8.
46. It is conceivable that a defendant still would seek comparative contribution if
for some reason he had to satisfy the plaintiff's full claim. However, it would be much
simpler for him to merely seek comparative partial indemnity. See supra note 39 and
accompanying text.
47. American Motorcycle, 20 Cal. 3d at 599-604, 578 P.2d at 912-16, 146 Cal. Rptr.
at 195-99.
48. Id. at 584, 578 P.2d at 902, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 185.
49. As the court noted in American Motorcycle, the Contribution Statutes are to be
applied in accordance with the principles of equity. Id. at 602-03, 578 P.2d at 915, 146
Cal. Rptr. at 198. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 875(b) (West 1980). Thus, according
to the California Supreme Court, it is logical to move from a contribution system to a
comparative negligence system, and this can be done within the Contribution Statutes.
The court however, probably could not foresee the inequitable results that would de-
velop as a result of its judicially created system. "Equity," in 1957, had a much differ-
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portions fault on a comparative negligence basis. The one thing it
should not do is try to apply comparative negligence to an already
existing contribution system. As the good faith settlement cases
have shown and will continue to show, the Contribution Statutes
have become outmoded and are rendered useless by the evolving
definition of "equity" in California's joint tort system.
II. SETrLEMENT PROBLEMS IN CALIFORNIA JOINT
TORTFEASOR LAW
A. Policy of Encouraging Settlement Advanced by Section 877
California Code of Civil Procedure section 877 provides that a
defendant who makes a good faith settlement and is subsequently
released from the lawsuit by the plaintiff is forever shielded from
claims for contribution by his codefendants.50 In American Motor-
cycle, the protection afforded the settling defendant was extended to
discharge "any claim for partial or comparative indemnity that may
be pressed by a concurrent tortfeasor." 51 In 1980, the legislature
unfortunately followed the lead of the American Motorcycle court
and amended the Contribution Statutes to provide that a good faith
settlement "shall bar any other joint tortfeasor from any further
claims against the settling tortfeasor for equitable comparative con-
tribution, or partial or comparative indemnity, based on compara-
tive negligence or comparative fault."'5 2
Shielding the settling defendant from further claims has the obvi-
50. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
51. American Motorcycle, 20 Cal. 3d at 604, 578 P.2d at 915, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 198.
52. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.6(c) (West Supp. 1986). Section 877.6 provides:
(a) Any party to an action wherein it is alleged that two or more parties are
joint tortfeasors shall be entitled to a hearing on the issue of the good faith of a
settlement entered into by the plaintiff or other claimant and one or more
alleged tortfeasors, upon giving notice thereof in the manner provided in Sec-
tions 1010 and 1011 at least 20 days before the hearing. In addition, the no-
tice may be served by mail pursuant to Section 1012, but in those cases the
period of notice shall be at least 25 days if the place of address is within the
State of California, at least 30 days if the place of address is outside the State
of California but within the United States, and at least 40 days if the place of
address is outside the United States. Upon a showing of good cause, the court
may shorten the time for giving the required notice to permit the determina-
tion of the issue to be made before the commencement of the trial of the ac-
tion, or before the verdict or judgment if settlement is made after the trial has
commenced.
(b) The issue of the good faith of the settlement may be determined by the
court on the basis of affidavits served with the notice of hearing, and any
counteraffidavits filed in response thereto, or the court may, in its discretion,
receive other evidence at the hearing.
(c) A determination by the court that the settlement was made in good faith
shall bar any other joint tortfeasor from any further claims against the settling
tortfeasor for equitable comparative contribution, or partial or comparative
indemnity, based on comparative negligence or comparative fault.
10
California Western Law Review, Vol. 22 [1985], No. 2, Art. 7
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol22/iss2/7
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22
ous effect of encouraging him to settle as soon and at as low an
amount as possible. To that end, the policy of settlement is
encouraged.
Section 877 provides other elements that advance the policy of
settlement. Allowing a plaintiff to make a settlement with, and ulti-
mately dismiss, one of several tortfeasors without prejudicing his
claim against the other remaining defendants encourages settlement
for both parties. It has been said that "[t]he advantage to both
plaintiff and the settling tortfeasors of being permitted to make an
independent settlement is sufficiently obvious."' 53 Further comment
is not needed.
Additionally, a plaintiff is encouraged to settle by reducing his
recovery at trial only by the amount he has actually received in
settlement.5 4 The plaintiff need not be too concerned about settling
for an amount that is less than the true share of the settling defend-
ant's liability, because he can merely recover it from the other de-
fendants at trial. Under the joint and several liability doctrine, the
remaining defendants must provide full compensation for the plain-
tiff's damages.55
The danger presented by the encouragements to settle provided in
section 877, juxtaposed with the competing policies of equitable ap-
(d) The party asserting the lack of good faith shall have the burden of proof
on that issue.
(e) When a determination of the good faith or lack of good faith of a settle-
ment is made, any party aggrieved by the determination may petition the
proper court to review the determination by writ of mandate. The petition for
writ of mandate shall be filed within 20 days after service of written notice of
the determination, or within such additional time not exceeding 20 days as the
trial court may allow.
(1) The court shall, within 30 days of the receipt of all materials to be filed
by the parties, determine whether or not the court will hear the writ and notify
the parties of its determination.
(2) If the court grants a hearing on the writ, the hearing shall be given spe-
cial precedence over all other civil matters on the calendar of the court except
those matters to which equal or greater precedence on the calendar is granted
by law.
The running of any period of time after which an action would be subject to
dismissal pursuant to Section 583 shall be tolled during the period of review of
a determination pursuant to this subdivision.
CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 877.6 (West Supp. 1986).
It is unfortunate that the legislature acted with such haste in codifying American
Motorcycle. Obviously, this was due in part to the need to develop procedural methods
of determining "good faith." However, a longer period of reflection on the subject may
have been worth the wait, had the legislature realized the danger of affirming American
Motorcycle's commingling of the contribution and comparative fault systems.
53. Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act § 4 commissioners' comment
(1955), 12 U.L.A. 99 (1975).
54. The plaintiff's recovery also could be reduced by the "amount stipulated,"
whichever is greater, but it would be highly illogical for a plaintiff to voluntarily dimin-
ish his recovery by so doing.
55. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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portionment of fault, should now be evident. Defendant is eager to
settle; eager to escape potential liability to his codefendants, espe-
cially if he is the primary cause of the plaintiff's injuries. Plaintiff
could care less if one defendant settles, so long as the remaining
defendants have deep, dollar-lined pockets. The problem lies in the
situation where the remaining defendants' shares of fault are rela-
tively minimal when compared to their now settled-out codefend-
ant. The remaining defendants are required to bear both the burden
of the responsibility that their codefendant has shirked, and more
importantly, the plaintiff's judgment.
B. Definition of "Good Faith Settlement"
One approach to solving this problem has centered around the
requirement that a settlement, in order to bring on section 877's
benefits, must be made in "good faith." Prior to the recent Tech-
Bilt decision, the view of one court was that the "good faith" provi-
sion required the parties contemplating settlement to make a deter-
mination of the settling defendant's relative share of fault for the
plaintiff's damages.56 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, apply-
ing California law as it correctly predicted the California Supreme
Court would, held in Owen v. United States57 and Commercial
Union Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co.,58 that if the settlement in issue
clearly did not take relative fault into consideration, then it was not
in good faith and thus did not bar claims for comparative partial
indemnity. Tech-Bilt has essentially followed the Ninth Circuit
rationale.
The primary California authority relied on to support the Califor-
nia Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit views is River Garden Farms,
Inc. v. Superior Court.59 River Garden was the first case to discuss
the issue of good faith settlements and now, even though it has
sought to reach an accommodation between the two competing
goals of equitable financial sharing and encouraging settlements,
60 it
has proven to be a thorn in the side of the policy of equitable appor-
tionment of fault. Because it was decided in 1972, prior to the
adoption of the comparative negligence system, the issue of "good
faith" arose in River Garden within the statutorily enacted system
of contribution.61 Notwithstanding that fact, language from River
56. See Owen v. United States, 713 F.2d 1461 (9th Cir. 1983) and Commercial
Union Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 640 F.2d 210 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858
(1981).
57. Owen, 713 F.2d at 1466.
58. Commercial Union, 640 F.2d at 214.
59. River Garden, 26 Cal. App. 3d 986, 103 Cal. Rptr. 498.
60. Id. at 997-98, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 506-07.
61. That fact alone should have compelled courts looking at "good faith" within
1986]
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Garden sounds very persuasive when applied by courts trying to get
a handle on "good faith" under our current hybrid contribution/
comparative fault system. For example, the following statement
about "good faith" was given in River Garden: "Viewed as a de-
mand for settlements which have a reasonable relation to the value
of the plaintiff's case, to the strengths and weaknesses of the parties
and the financial ability of the settlor, the good faith clause aids the
statutory goal of equitable sharing."'62
A passage such as this, though written while contribution was the
procedure for equitable financial sharing, lends itself very easily to
application in a decision defining "good faith" within the frame-
work of a comparative fault system, which focuses on equitable
fault sharing. And, since the courts first defining "good faith" after
American Motorcycle were forced to bring the comparative fault
and contribution systems together, they were more than happy to
borrow from this earlier precedent.63
More recent opinions, decided prior to Tech-Bilt, struggled with
different notions of "good faith," trying to achieve results that
would be satisfactory and fair to both settling and non-settling de-
fendants alike.64 The decisions attempted to strike a balance be-
tween the competing policies of equitable apportionment of fault
and encouragement of settlement, all the while focusing on the
question, "what is good faith?" Deciding what "good faith" is,
however, only begs the question. Unfortunately, River Garden has
deceived subsequent courts trying to define "good faith" into believ-
ing that some magic definition of the words would solve the prob-
lem of balancing the two juxtaposed policies.
However, with each decision rendered, it became increasingly
clear that the two policies could not coexist within the hybrid con-
tribution/comparative fault system. Thus, the attempts to balance
the comparative fault system, such as the Tech-Bilt, Owen and Commercial Union
courts, to give little credence to the River Garden decision. Chief Justice Bird's dissent
in Tech-Bilt recognized the inappropriate use of River Garden as precedent for the prop-
osition that "good faith" means a settlement reasonably related to the settlor's share of
fault. Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal. 3d at 502-05, 698 P.2d at 169-71, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 266-68
(Bird, C.J., dissenting).
62. River Garden, 26 Cal. App. 3d at 994, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 504. The court of
appeals did not pick up on the fact that "equitable sharing" meant equal sharing and
not sharing according to fault.
63. See generally Owen, 713 F.2d 461; Commercial Union, 620 F.2d 210; Tech-Bilt.
38 Cal. 3d 488, 698 P.2d 159, 213 Cal. Rptr. 256; and Fisher v. Superior Court, 103 Cal.
App. 3d 434, 163 Cal. Rptr. 47 (1980).
64. Compare Dompeling v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. App. 3d 798, 173 Cal. Rptr.
38 (1981) (non-tortious conduct equals "good faith") and Cardio Systems, Inc. v. Supe-
rior Court, 122 Cal. App. 3d 880, 176 Cal. Rptr. 254 (1981) (non-tortious conduct
equals "good faith") with Torres v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 157 Cal. App. 3d 499, 203
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the two policies were largely self-defeating, and one of the two poli-
cies emerged victorious. In California's hybrid system, the policy of
encouraging settlements won out and, therefore, a most narrow
view of "good faith" gained the weight of authority before the
supreme court stepped into the fray with Tech-Bilt.
C. Policy of Encouraging Settlement Worked Inequitable Results
The courts found it impossible to advance both policies at the
same time, so instead, they allowed the encouragement of settle-
ments to gain the upper hand.65 The decisions of Dompeling v. Su-
perior Court66 and Cardio Systems, Inc. v. Superior Court67 are
illustrative. The Dompeling court held that "[t]he settling parties
owe the non-settling defendants a legal duty to refrain from tortious
or other wrongful conduct; absent conduct violative of such duty,
the settling parties may act to further their respective interests with-
out regard to the effect of their settlement upon other
defendants." 68
Thus, with the Dompeling decision, the definition of good faith
became considerably narrower than it previously had been. In the
context of the Dompeling case itself, no apparent hardship to the
nonsettling defendants was caused by the narrowed definition, since
the settlement there was not "an 'unreasonably cheap settlement' on
its face."'69
However, in Cardio Systems, an inequitable result did occur when
the plaintiffs dismissed defendant Cardio Systems, the distributor of
an allegedly defective heart-lung machine, for a waiver of defense
65. The policy of encouraging settlements has come to the forefront in the follow-
ing cases: Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 160 Cal. App. 3d 489, 206 Cal. Rptr. 675
(1984); Torres, 157 Cal. App. 3d 499, 203 Cal. Rptr. 825; Huizar v. Abex Corp., 156
Cal. App. 3d 534, 203 Cal. Rptr. 47 (1984); Widson v. International Harvester Co., 153
Cal. App. 3d 45, 200 Cal. Rptr. 136 (1984); Ford Motor Co. v. Schultz, 147 Cal. App.
3d 941, 195 Cal. Rptr. 470 (1983); Lopez v. Blecher, 143 Cal. App. 3d 736, 192 Cal.
Rptr. 190 (1983); Kohn v. Superior Court, 142 Cal. App. 3d 323, 191 Cal. Rptr. 78
(1983); Wysong & Miles Co. v. Western Indus. Movers, 143 Cal. App. 3d 278, 191 Cal.
Rptr. 671 (1983); Turcon Construction, Inc. v. Norton-Villiers, Ltd., 139 Cal. App. 3d
280, 188 Cal. Rptr. 580 (1983); Burlington Northern R.R. Co. v. Superior Court, 137
Cal. App. 3d 942, 187 Cal. Rptr. 376 (1982); Cardio Systems, 122 Cal. App. 3d 880, 176
Cal. Rptr. 254; Dompeling, 117 Cal. App. 3d 798, 173 Cal. Rptr. 38; and Fisher, 103
Cal. App. 3d 434, 163 Cal. Rptr. 47. See also discussion of Tech-Bilt, infra notes 80-87
and accompanying text.
66. 117 Cal. App. 3d 798, 173 Cal. Rptr. 38.
67. 122 Cal. App. 3d 880, 176 Cal. Rptr. 254.
68. Dompeling, 117 Cal. App. 3d at 809-10, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 45. The Dompeling
definition of "good faith" is much like the definition envisioned by the drafters of the
Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act. See supra note 20. The incompatibility
of the two joint tortfeasor systems together is illustrated by the inequitable results
reached when this definition is used.
69. Dompeling, 117 Cal. App. 3d at 807, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 43 (quoting River Gar-
den, 26 Cal. App. 3d at 996, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 498).
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costs. 70 The machine had malfunctioned while plaintiffs' decedent
underwent open heart surgery. 71 The dismissal was given to Cardio
Systems only because of a tactical decision made by plaintiffs' attor-
ney. As he himself put it, "I had no desire. . to complicate a
clear liability, relatively simple medical malpractice case by bring-
ing in a products case."'72
The trial court, though finding no collusion between plaintiffs
and Cardio Systems, did not find the dismissal to be in good faith.73
However, the court of appeals reversed, holding that Cardio Sys-
tems acted consistently with the principles set forth in Dompeling;
that a settling defendant owes no duty to a nonsettling codefendant
except to refrain from tortious or wrongful conduct.74 Thus, the
codefendant hospital was barred from recovering from Cardio Sys-
tems even one dollar of the one million dollars it had paid to satisfy
plaintiffs' judgment.75
The court was not happy with the decision it felt compelled to
reach, stating:
The result is unsatisfactory. The rule permits a plaintiff to in-
sulate a defendant (Cardio) from being liable to a codefendant
(Hospital) for comparative indemnity by dismissing against
Cardio in consideration of a waiver of costs where the dismissal
is motivated by plaintiffs' tactical considerations having little re-
lationship to the potential liability of Cardio. . . .The result is
fundamentally unfair, and cannot be what the Legislature
intended. 76
Of course, it was not what the legislature had intended, since it
had no idea in 1957 that a comparative fault system would one day
uncomfortably coexist with the cost sharing contribution scheme it
enacted.
The Cardio Systems court, like others, called for help from the
legislature. 77 Another asked for guidance from the supreme
court.78 The latter got their wish first. A good faith settlement
case, Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates,79 was argued
70. Cardio Systems, 122 Cal. App. 3d at 882, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 255.
71. Id. at 883, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 256.
72. Id. at 884-85, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 256.
73. Id. at 883, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 255.
74. Id. at 890, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 260.
75. Id. at 882, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 255.
76. Id. at 890-91, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 260.
77. See, e.g., Torres, 157 Cal. App. 3d 499, 203 Cal. Rptr. 825; Huizar, 156 Cal.
App. 3d 534, 203 Cal. Rptr. 47; and Burlington, 137 Cal. App. 3d 942, 187 Cal. Rptr.
376,
78. Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 160 Cal. App. 3d 489, 206 Cal. Rptr. 674
(1984).
79. Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal. 3d 488, 698 P.2d 159, 213 Cal. Rptr. 256.
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before the California Supreme Court in 1984, putting "good faith"
squarely at issue before the justices for the first time.
In Tech-Bilt, the court was faced with a dilemma similar to the
one faced by the Cardio Systems court. Plaintiffs brought suit for
damages to their residential property, naming everyone involved in
the construction of the house as defendants.80 Believing one of the
claims to be barred by the statute of limitations, and for no other
reason, plaintiffs dismissed Woodward-Clyde for a waiver of de-
fense costs. 81 One of the other defendants, Tech-Bilt, still had a live
claim against Woodward-Clyde and thus filed a cross-complaint
against Woodward-Clyde for indemnity and declaratory relief.82
Woodward-Clyde moved for an order confirming the dismissal
given by plaintiffs as a good faith settlement.83
The trial court's decision that the dismissal was a good faith set-
tlement was appealed by Tech-Bilt to the supreme court. The
supreme court reversed. 84 It considered the Dompeling and Cardio
Systems viewpoint of good faith, but rejected it.85 Instead, the court
continued down the path it had begun in American Motorcycle,
holding that in order for a settlement to be found in good faith, it
must be "within the reasonable range of the settling tortfeasor's
proportional share of comparative liability for the plaintiff's
injuries."'86
On the surface, the Tech-Bilt decision sounds logical and well-
reasoned. It attempts to strike a balance between the competing
policies of encouraging settlement and apportioning liability in rela-
tion to fault. However, in attempting to strike that balance, the
supreme court has overlooked the new meaning that the word "eq-
uity" has come to have, just as it overlooked the meaning in Ameri-
can Motorcycle. The court once again has adhered to the notion
that the "equity" envisioned by the Contribution Statutes can be-
come the new "equity" of a post-American Motorcycle comparative
fault system, without repealing the Contribution Statutes them-
selves. What the court fails to see is that the comparative negli-
gence system cannot and should not coexist with a contribution
system.
The Contribution Statutes were a much needed and helpful re-
80. Id. at 491, 698 P.2d at 161, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 258.
81. Id. at 492, 698 P.2d at 161, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 258. The waiver of defense costs
in effect amounted to a "settlement" for $55.00. Id. at 492 n.2, 698 P.2d at 161 n.2, 213
Cal. Rptr. at 258 n.2.
82. Id. at 492, 698 P.2d at 161, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 258.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 502, 698 P.2d at 168, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 265.
85. Id. at 498-99, 698 P.2d at 166, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 263.
86. Id. at 499, 698 P.2d at 166, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 263.
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form of a common law joint tort system that was causing highly
inequitable results. But now, we have come almost full circle from
our pre-Contribution Statute days. Back in the 1950's a plaintiff
could pick out a lone, unlucky defendant and require him to satisfy
his entire tort judgment. The bar balked at the unfairness of such a
system and change was implemented. Today, even with the Tech-
Bilt decision, which attempts to encourage only those settlements
which reflect a reasonable share of the settling defendant's fault, the
plaintiff can still control the litigation. The policy of encouraging
settlement is still clearly at the forefront and the policy of equitable
apportionment is apparently only given lip service when the court
says that the non-settling defendant "should be permitted to
demonstrate, if he can, that the settlement is so far 'out of the
ballpark' . . . as to be inconsistent with the equitable objectives of
the statute."' 87 Since the "equitable objectives" have in truth
changed quite a bit since the enactment of the statutes, no one can
say just how big or small the "ballpark" is. Thus, no one can say
whether or not the policy of equitable apportionment of fault will
ever really be advanced.
It seems the more things change in California joint tortfeasor law,
the more they stay the same. Even so, the state cannot continue
with its head in the sand, hoping that somehow it will reach the
goal of dividing responsibility in relation to proportionate fault. To
the contrary, action must be taken to create a more fair system.
Perhaps California jumped into a comparative negligence system a
little too fast with judge-made law, without the thorough investiga-
tion that a legislature could have provided. By adopting the system
in the heat of the courtroom, perhaps all potential difficulties in
applying the new system could not be examined. 88
In any event, the Li and American Motorcycle decisions are be-
hind us, and we have seen that their application in our already ex-
isting joint tortfeasor system has been anything but smooth.
Consequently, we now must effect changes that will increase the
likelihood of each and every joint tortfeasor bearing only his fair
share of fault.
III. PROPOSED REFORM OF CALIFORNIA JOINT
TORTFEASOR LAW
A. Method of Change
Basically, there are two routes which may be taken to achieve the
desired change in our joint tortfeasor law-judicial decision or legis-
87. Id. at 499-500, 698 P.2d at 167, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 264 (emphasis added).
88. See supra notes 6 and 20 and accompanying text.
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lative change. The journey on the first of these routes has already
started, but unfortunately, it will likely prove to be ineffective. The
California Supreme Court's decision in Tech-Bilt is nothing but an
acceptance of River Garden and American Motorcycle, and does lit-
tle, if anything, to advance the goal of distributing responsibility in
relation to proportionate shares of fault.
Granted, the supreme court has attempted to balance the com-
peting policies as best as it can.89 But the roots of the problem lie in
the court's misconception that the "equity" envisioned by the Con-
tribution Statutes can evolve smoothly into a new "equity" in a
comparative fault system. Thus, the second of the two routes, legis-
lative change, is best suited to halt the inequities with which Cali-
fornia is now struggling.
B. Repeal of Existing Contribution Statutes
What sort of change can bring the desired result? The initial step
is to get rid of California's anachronistic Contribution Statutes.
They are clearly out of place in a comparative fault system. The
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
supports this change.90
In approving its Uniform Comparative Fault Act [hereinafter re-
ferred to as the UCFA] in 1977, the commissioners stated that a
statutory contribution system would be inappropriate in a jurisdic-
tion that adopted the UCFA.91 Though California has not adopted
the UCFA, the state's judicially adopted comparative fault system
is quite similar to the one proposed by the commissioners. 92 The
commissioners' prefatory note to the UCFA explains the general
policy considerations of a comparative fault system and distin-
guishes it from the older contribution system. In so doing, it states
that, "an act which provides for pro rata contribution may be suit-
able in a state not applying the principle of comparative fault, but is
inappropriate in a comparative fault state apportioning ultimate re-
sponsibility on the basis of the proportionate fault of the parties
involved."93
89. After all, the court is unable to repeal the Contribution Statutes on its own. At
the most, it can make a strong plea to the legislature to do so.
90. UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT commissioners' prefatory note (1977),
12 U.L.A. 39-40 (Supp. 1985).
91. Id.
92. Both comparative fault systems are of the pure type. Additionally, both allow
for the pressing of comparative partial indemnity claims.
93. UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT commissioners' prefatory note (1977),
12 U.L.A. 39-40 (Supp. 1985). Specifically, the commissioners were referring to the
1939 and 1959 Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Acts. As was noted at supra
note 20, California's Contribution Statutes are closely modeled on the 1955 Uniform
Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act.
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The reasons for this are clear. The right to pro rata contribution
is relatively insignificant to a joint tortfeasor who can have his de-
gree of fault measured before he ever must pay a penny to his judg-
ment debtor.94 Moreover, under a comparative fault system, the
joint tortfeasors should never have to satisfy the plaintiff's entire
judgment (absent a finding that the alleged joint tortfeasor is 100
percent at fault or that his cotortfeasor is judgment-proof). Rather,
he should only pay a sum directly proportional to his share of ac-
tual fault. Thus, the joint tortfeasor would derive no recognizable
benefit from satisfying the plaintiff's judgment and then seeking pro
rata contribution.
C. Enactment of New Code Provisions
The second step in tailoring our joint tortfeasor law to achieve
the policy objectives of Li and American Motorcycle would be to
enact new code provisions. Before discussing this proposal, how-
ever, it may be wise to examine California's comparative fault sys-
tem, absent the Contribution Statutes, to see its deficiencies without
the proposed additions.
Basically, the non-Contribution Statutes system would be quite
alien to our traditional view of joint tort justice, although it would
be the ideal vehicle for equitable cost sharing. Hopefully, the equi-
table benefits have been presented clearly enough in other portions
of this Comment, and do not need further emphasis here.95 Suffice
it to say that in such a "free market system," without constraints or
controls, defendants would not need to be worried about paying
more than their proportionate share.
However, protective devices to ensure the injured plaintiff recov-
ers what is owed him and the prior benefits available to induce the
parties into pretrial settlement, are conspicuously missing. Immedi-
ately apparent is the absence of a procedural safeguard allowing a
harmed plaintiff to recover all of the damages to which he is
entitled.
Specifically, without the joint and several liability rule, the plain-
tiff would be required to shoulder the danger of one of his several
tortfeasors being judgment proof. The law should not encourage
the possibility of this occurrence, especially when the defendants
who are able to pay have proximately caused the plaintiff's injuries.
In other words, the plaintiff's overall injury would not have oc-
curred without each tortfeasor contributing in some way to it; thus,
it is more equitable to place the burden of a judgment proof code-
94. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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fendant on the remaining defendants, whose conduct is more culpa-
ble than the injured plaintiff's.
This argument loses some of its vitality when the plaintiff's own
conduct has contributed to his injuries. However, its logic is still
retained when we consider the relative positions of the plaintiff and
his alleged tortfeasors. The plaintiff is still less culpable than the
defendant, since he has only failed to act with due regard for his
own safety; the defendants on the other hand, have acted without
regard for another's safety.96 Thus, the proposed revision calls for
retention of the joint and several liability rule.
The second ill effect of our comparative fault system without the
Contribution Statutes is the loss of incentives to settle. As was set
forth previously, 97 the incentives provided to a plaintiff under the
Contribution Statutes were: (1) the ability to make independent set-
tlements, and (2) the pecuniary benefits of having his judgment off-
set only pro tanto by any settlement entered into. A defendant's
incentives to settle were: (1) like plaintiff, the ability to make an
independent settlement, and (2) the discharge from liability for con-
tribution, and subsequently, comparative partial indemnity.
Without these incentives, it would be less appealing to plaintiffs
and defendants alike to negotiate any pretrial disposition of plain-
tiff's claim. But would a system lacking these incentives still pro-
vide any reason for either of the sides to settle? Assuming logically
that the right to make independent settlement is retained, it would.
For example, a plaintiff might settle a claim with one of the de-
fendants to acquire cash needed to continue his litigation against
the other parties. Also, a plaintiff might settle with a defendant,
such as the distributor of the heart-lung machine in Cardio Systems,
in order to simplify his case. Finally, in order to avoid litigation
completely, a plaintiff might make a settlement with all the defend-
ants in the case.
However, the reasons that a plaintiff might still settle a claim do
little for the guys on the other side of the table, the defendants.
96. The argument especially loses vitality when the plaintiff is more at fault than
any of the defendants individually or together. When that is the case, the imposition of
joint and several liability on the defendants can work a highly inequitable result. For
example, imagine the case where a skier, cavalierly avoiding warning signs and barriers,
skis off the marked trails at a ski area. He suffers a horrible fall and sues both the ski
area and the municipality where the fall occurred, on the grounds that the warnings
were ineffective. Though plaintiff is found primarily at fault, some fault is attributed to
both the ski area and the municipality. Plaintiffs injuries are severe and he has in-
curred enormous hospital bills. Should either the municipality or the ski area be re-
quired to pay plaintiff in this case? A strong argument is presented by this fact situation
to make a rule whereby joint and several liability should not be imposed when plaintiff
is more than 50% at fault for his own injuries.
97. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
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Unless all defendants settled with the plaintiff, thereby bringing the
lawsuit to an end, they would have little, if any, reason to reach a
settlement agreement. A lone defendant would find little utility in
settling with the plaintiff by himself, since he could not close his
books on the case. Until the litigation had drawn to a close, the
settling defendant would remain vulnerable to claims for compara-
tive indemnity brought by his codefendants. Thus, the benefits pro-
vided by settling, such as putting a halt to time and money-
consuming litigation, would not accrue to the lone settling
defendant.
Furthermore, a defendant would not want to settle with the
plaintiff if he felt he had a valid cross-claim against the plaintiff
himself. If there was an issue with respect to the contributory negli-
gence of the plaintiff, or if the defendant himself was injured in the
same occurrence that the plaintiff was, then the defendant would
not want to sacrifice that claim.
Therefore, while sufficient reasons remain for the plaintiff to set-
tle in the non-Contribution Statutes system, it would seem prudent
to provide the defendant with an incentive to get him to the bar-
gaining table. Consequently, the proposed revision calls for reten-
tion of the settlement incentive designed with the defendant in
mind, while modifying the incentive provided for plaintiff.
Framed by the foregoing considerations, it is proposed by this
Comment that, in addition to repeal of the Contribution Statutes,
the legislature consider enacting a new section of the California
Code of Civil Procedure that will advance the policy of equitable
apportionment of fault, as well as the goals of full recovery for
plaintiff and encouragement of settlement.98
First, it is suggested that the doctrine of joint and several liability
be retained in the new section.99 Clearly, we must ensure that a
plaintiff has the opportunity to be fully compensated for the harm
caused him by others. 10 0 Giving him the right to satisfy his judg-
ment against any of the culpable tortfeasors is the best guarantee
that the plaintiff will recover what is rightfully his.
Additionally, no detriment other than a temporary absence of the
money a judgment-satisfier has paid will be worked on the
tortfeasors. Their rights to comparative partial indemnity and com-
parative contribution will ensure that each defendant pay no more
than his fair share.
Second, it is suggested that the new section include a provision
98. Schemes like the one proposed have been implemented in other states and have
been recommended by other commentators. See infra notes 101-02.
99. See supra notes 3, 13, 25, and 55 and accompanying text.
100. Subject, of course, to the limitations set forth in supra note 96.
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which allows a settling defendant to be released from claims for
comparative partial indemnity and comparative contribution
brought against him by his codefendants. 101 With this provision, an
incentive is provided to encourage a defendant to sit down with the
plaintiff and seriously negotiate a settlement agreement. The deep-
pocket defendant will be particularly interested in effecting a rapid
compromise so that he can alleviate the threat of having to satisfy
both his share and a judgment-proof defendant's share, under the
doctrine of joint and several liability.
Turning the deep-pocket/judgment-proof defendant scenario
around, it might be contended that a plaintiff would be hesitant to
make an early settlement with the deep-pocket defendant, knowing
there was no chance of recovery from the judgment-proof defend-
ant. However, it is submitted that the slight chilling effect on settle-
ments which might be produced is outweighed by the advantages
that the plaintiff, as well as the settling defendant, receive by ending
their litigation out of court.
Finally, it is suggested that the new section include a provision
that a settlement reduce the plaintiff's recovery at trial by an
amount reflecting the settling defendant's fair share of fault rather
than by the actual dollar amount of the settlement.10 2 The equita-
ble principles enunciated in Li and American Motorcycle will thus
be advanced in three ways.
First, the parties to the settlement will be required to give some
serious thought to the value of the part of the lawsuit to be settled.
If the parties are sincerely interested in reaching a settlement, they
will realize that puffing of demands or understating of offers will do
no good. Following this reasoning, and second, the plaintiff will no
longer be encouraged to choose a defendant that will be able to ben-
efit from his benevolence in making a ridiculously low "good faith
settlement." Third, the remaining nonsettling defendants will not
be forced to bear the burden of their settling codefendant's fault. If
the settlor is more at fault than the remaining tortfeasors, the
amount of the settlement should reflect that fact. Then, when the
101. A similar provision is called for in the Uniform Comparative Fault Act. See
UNIPOM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 6 (1977), 12 U.L.A. 48-49 (Supp. 1985). Fur-
ther, New York, which like California judicially adopted pure comparative negligence,
has adopted this provision in its statute granting comparative contribution among joint
tortfeasors. See N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 15-108 (McKinney 1978).
102. Such a reduction is called for by the Uniform Comparative Fault Act. See
UNIFOM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 6 (1977), 12 U.L.A. 48-49 (Supp. 1985). New
York's comparative contribution statute provides that a settlement reduces a plaintiff's
claim, among other options, "in the amount of the released tortfeasor's equitable share
of the damages...." N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 15-108(a) (McKinney 1978). For
other possible methods adopted in pure comparative negligence systems, see also Wis.
STAT. ANN. §§ 4.22.040-.060 (West Supp. 1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 70, § 303 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1985); and FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.31(3) (West Supp. 1985).
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reduction in plaintiff's recovery is made at trial, each party will
have borne their respective fair shares and plaintiff will have recov-
ered all of his damages.
The proposals set forth obviously will not be an end-all to
problems that arise in joint tort litigation. However, they will help
alleviate the inequity that is currently existing as a result of "good
faith settlements" and will improve California's fault distribution
system.
CONCLUSION
As the California Supreme Court noted in American Motorcycle,
quoting Dean Prosser, "'[t]here is obvious lack of sense and justice
in a rule which permits the entire burden of loss, for which two
defendants were. . . unintentionally responsible, to be shouldered
onto one alone. . . while the latter goes scot free.' "103 Applying a
comparative fault system in an already existing contribution system
has created "good faith settlement" problems lacking sense and jus-
tice. Entire burdens have been shouldered by one defendant, while
his codefendant is allowed to go scot free.
The inequity of this result compels the repeal of the Contribution
Statutes. In their place, the legislature should enact a new Califor-
nia Code of Civil Procedure section retaining the joint and several
liability doctrine as well as the rule allowing a settling joint
tortfeasor to be shielded from claims brought by his codefendants
for comparative partial indemnity and comparative contribution.
The new code section should also modify the rule reducing a plain-
tiff's recovery by the amount of consideration actually paid, instead
of reducing such recovery by an amount which reflects the settling
defendant's fair share of liability.
These proposals will effectively limit the possibility of a plaintiff
selectively granting one of several defendants the benefit of a good
faith settlement and, more importantly, will give meaning and effect
to the policy considerations of the Li and American Motorcycle deci-
sions. Acceptance of these suggestions will bring California joint
tortfeasor law out of the 1950's and back into 1986.
Christopher W. Todd
103. American Motorcycle, 20 Cal. 3d at 608, 578 P.2d at 918, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 201.
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